Rocket Street

China’s commercial space sector did not exist until the government decided it should. A 2014 State Council policy, often called Document 60, opened launch and satellite work to private capital for the first time, and an industry materialised in the space of a few years.^[1] From roughly a dozen firms in 2015, China counted about 300 commercial-space companies by 2022.^[1]

The milestones followed. In July 2019 iSpace became the first private Chinese company to reach orbit; four years later LandSpace did something no one had: its Zhuque-2 became the world’s first liquid-methane rocket to reach orbit, in July 2023, beating SpaceX’s Starship, Blue Origin, ULA and Rocket Lab to a fuel the whole industry is chasing.^[2][3] A handful of names now define the field: LandSpace, Galactic Energy, iSpace, Space Pioneer, Orienspace and Deep Blue Aerospace.^[4]

Around 300 companies, and eight that have actually reached orbit. The gap between the two numbers is the whole story.

Capital, mostly public

The money has followed the policy, and much of it is the state’s. Galactic Energy raised about 2.4 billion yuan in a single round; LandSpace is preparing a Shanghai listing that could raise some 7.5 billion.^[1] But local-government funds tripled to around 16 billion yuan in 2025, roughly 60% of the sector’s total, while private investment ran near a fifth, and Beijing opened a dedicated “Rocket Street” industrial park in early 2025.^[1] This is a commercial sector in name, with a state hand on the throttle.

One number needs its caveat. The headline “300 companies” counts all commercial-space firms, satellite makers, component suppliers, data services. Only several dozen build launchers, and just eight have reached orbit.^[1] Breadth of activity is not the same as depth of capability.

The bottom line for capital

China’s launch boom is real, fast and unmistakably policy-made — which is exactly why it needs reading carefully. The sector has genuine technical firsts to its name and a deep bench of funded startups, but its capital is disproportionately public and its roster of orbit-capable firms is short. The investable discipline is to look past the company count to the eight that fly, to distinguish a methane-to-orbit first from routine, cheap, repeatable access, and to price the state’s heavy hand as both the reason the sector exists and a limit on how “commercial” it really is. The boom is genuine; the shakeout has not happened yet.